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Judicial lawmaking constitutes the primary mechanism for
the progressive construction of international law today.
International judges and arbitrators make law, as a by-product
of their functions as dispute-resolvers, not least, through
interpreting norms found in treaties and other recognized
sources of law.' They do so, increasingly, in dialogues with
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1. We see nothing controversial in this statement. International judges
make law to the extent that their rulings alter or clarify the meaning (as
regards content, scope, or application) of international legal norms
(customary international law, a treaty, or a general principle of law) in ways
that judges, lawyers, and other actors will credit has having some, at least
soft, precedential effect. On the issue of judicial lawmaking, see generally
Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International judicial
Institutions as Lawmakers, 12 GER. L.J. 979 (2011), available at http://www.ger
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judges across jurisdictional boundaries. In this contribution to
the 2013 Symposium of the New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics, we explore these themes,
focusing in particular on how judges and arbitrators have
developed general principles of law.
Our focus on general principles of law deserves some
preliminary discussion. As all readers will know, "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations,"2 which we
would amend to include recognition among judges in effective
legal systems, comprises one of the sources of law that
members of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and by
extension all other international judges, are under a duty to
apply, when relevant to a dispute at bar. At the same time,
there is no codified statement of the content of the general
principles, and no authoritative, prescribed method for
identifying and applying them. Historically, the most
important principles materialized in national judicial
decisions, as more or less self-evident propositions, beginning
in the late nineteenth century in Europe. General principles
are unwritten, doctrinal constructions, institutionalized as case
manlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol12-No5/PDF_- Vol_12_No_05_979-1004_Be
yond%20Disptue%20SpecialBogdandy%20&%2OVenzke%20FINAL.pdf
(demonstrating that international judicial lawmaking is ubiquitous,
important, and beyond dispute). For a discussion of precedent by various
international courts by a former President of the International Court of
Justice, see Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International judges and
Arbitrators, 2 J. INT'L Disp. SETTLEMENT 5, 23 (2011) (arguing that "recourse
to precedent is a necessity" for litigants, judges, and arbitrators, as well as to
provide a basis for judicial dialogues across jurisdictional boundaries).
2. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states
that:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.
Statute of the International Court ofJustice art. 38(1), Apr. 14, 1986, 59 Stat.
1031.
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law. Generated in the course of dispute resolution, national
judges subsequently apply them (typically) as inherent, taken-
for-granted, constituent elements of their legal systems. From
the point of view of the wider legal order, these principles, in
effect, supplement the national constitution or important
legislation. In some cases, the principles substitute for the
absence of any basic text that would govern the work of the
courts, the paradigmatic case being the development of the
general principles by the French Supreme Administrative
Court, the Conseil d'Etat, and diffusion of this method to other
jurisdictions across Europe and globally. It is no exaggeration
to say that much of European (and Latin American) public
law has been constituted by the development of general
principles.
When international judges develop general principles of
law, they become architects of their own legal systems, in
relation to other legal systems. In identifying and applying a
new general principle to resolve a dispute, they necessarily
make new law. But the law they make, it is asserted, already
exists as a matter of law-to the extent that other judges in
different systems have developed the same principle in ways
that have made it both normal and legitimate for use by all
judges. Not surprisingly, those who worry about the
destabilizing effects of judicial lawmaking, and who believe
that judges can effectively resolve disputes without becoming
lawmakers, will find no comfort in a jurisprudence that
justifies the emergence of new law with reference to prior
episodes of judicial lawmaking undertaken elsewhere.
The development of general principles has catalyzed
systemic transformation in a wide range of national and
international judicial systems, not least because such principles
are foundational norms. Consider how scholars have
described their various functions. General principles, it is
claimed, lay "down the essential elements of the legal order,"3
express the "fundamental legal concepts and essential values
of any legal system," 4 and legitimate "all or any of the more
3. Armin von Bogdandy, Doctrine of Principles 10 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law
Jean Monnet Ctr., Working Paper No. 9/03, 2003), available at http://www
jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/03/030901-01.pdf.
4. Meinhard Hilf & Goetz Goettsche, The Relation of Economic and Non-
Economic Principles in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
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specific [legal] rules in question."5 Judges use principles to
facilitate and justify gap-filling, when norms and procedures
are determined to be inadequate or incomplete. They have
developed others, such as the proportionality principle, to
provide an analytic procedure for reconciling opposed values
and interests, or to resolve conflicts between two sets of norms.
And virtually all general principles can be deployed to
promote coherence and order in systems beset or threatened
by fragmentation, as well as to help judges adjust the law
dynamically in the face of external shocks or changing
circumstances.
At this point in time, it is likely that judges on
international courts need general principles more than do
their peers on established national courts. In most
international regimes, states have not provided a code of
procedures, and they have left crucial treaty norms
incomplete, expecting courts to complete them on an on-
going basis. In the realm of investor-state arbitration (ISA),
arbitrators are expected to enforce vague, open-textured
provisions to resolve transnational disputes. The most obvious
example is the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard,
which is common to virtually all bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), but which is simply stated but not defined further.
Today, the FET standard is treated by many arbitrators as a
repository of general principles, precisely because arbitrators
have interpreted it broadly, in light of principles that are
common to other legal systems. In any case, as we have noted,
the general principles of law are an authoritative source of law
for international judges and arbitrators, and treaty regimes
ought to, or must, be interpreted against the background of
such principles. How judges do so is the crucial empirical
question, and how they ought to do so is the crucial normative
question.
In this Article, we address these questions in three linked
ways. In Part I, we provide an overview of the process through
which the general principle of proportionality, which judges
operationalize as a multi-stage series of tests, has diffused
globally. Today, the most powerful courts in the world, at both
GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 9-10 n.13 (Stefan Griller ed., 2003).
5. Neil MacCormick, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 152 (1978).
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the national and international levels, use proportionality
analysis (PA) to assess state claims to available derogations
from constitutional or treaty obligations for measures that are
"necessary" to achieve important public or state interests. 6
In Part II, we examine how proportionality appeared in
ISA, in the context of the so-called Argentina cases that have
been arbitrated under the authority of the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Since
2005, a series of arbitral tribunals have been required to
interpret a derogation clause, contained in Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty (Art. XI-BIT)
which, Argentina claimed, exempted it from liability to
investors during its massive economic meltdown (roughly
1999-2002).7 In 2008, the tribunal in Continental Casualty v.
Argentina8 deployed a method of interpreting Art. XI-BIT that
was directly inspired by the jurisprudence of the Appellate
Body of the World Trade Organization. The move has been
controversial in some quarters. Jos6 Alvarez and his
collaborators, in particular, have harshly criticized the
Continental Casualty award as being indefensible legally.9
Alvarez's views on the Argentina cases are untenable and we
reject them.
6. See generally Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing
and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (2008)
(discussing the global use of proportionality analysis).
7. In chronological order: CMS Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 1 332 (May 12, 2005); LG&E Energy
Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/1, Decision on Liability,
202 (Oct. 3, 2006); Enron Corp., Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID Case No. Arb/01/3, Award, 1 322 (May 22, 2007); Sempra Energy
Int'l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16, Award, 1 364 (Sept. 28,
2007); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award,
58 (Sept. 5, 2008); El Paso Energy Int'l Company v. Arg. Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 50 (Oct. 31, 2011).
8. Cont'l Cas. Co., supra note 7, 1 192.
9. Jos6 E. Alvarez & Katheryn Khamsi, The Argentina Crisis and Foreign
Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the International Investment Regime, in THE
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND PoLIcy 2008/2009 379,
441 n.332 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009). See generally Jos6 E. Alvarez & Tegan
Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty v. Argentina, 9
TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 319 (2012), available at www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1828 (discussing the methodological
problems with the decision and advocating alternative rules of
interpretation).
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In Part III, we widen the scope of the inquiry to address
the evolution of the general principles of law more generally.
Certain fundamental principles of law, not least the maxim
nemo judex in re propria, derive from understandings about the
law that are shared by most, if not all, the legal systems of the
world. These general principles are foundational, in that they
help judges organize the internal morality of any legal system
based on the rule of law. When international and
supranational courts assess the validity of national rules and
measures, they should and do refer to the wider world of
principles. In a recent paper, Beware Boundary Crossings,10
Alvarez, after restating his objections to Continental Casualty,
argues that legal systems should not borrow from one another,
or evolve common principles, except in narrow circumstances.
We reject this view as well. Most important, Alvarez's approach
fails to explain actual judicial practice, as our brief survey of
the evolution of due process requirements in a variety of
national and international jurisdictions demonstrates.
I. THE GLOBAL DIFusIoN OF PROPORTIONALITY
The principle of proportionality has become a center-
piece of the jurisprudence of the world's most powerful na-
tional and international courts. From Germany, PA spread to
virtually every high court in Europe, to the supreme courts of
Canada, Israel, and New Zealand, to the constitutional courts
of South African and Colombia, and many others. 1 It is now
the unrivalled, best-practice standard for adjudicating constitu-
tional rights that are "qualified" by limitation clauses that per-
mit a state to burden the exercise of rights for important pub-
10. Jos6 Alvarez, Beware Boundary Crossings, in BOUNDARIES OF RIGHTS,
BOUNDARIES OF STATE (Tsvi Kahana & Anat Schnicov eds.) (forthcoming)
[hereinafter Alvarez: Boundary Crossings], available at http://www.law.yale
.edu/documents/pdf/sela/Bewareboundarycrossings-nofootnotes_%282%
29.pdf.
11. See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 6 (tracing the migration of
proportionality from Germany to Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa,
and across Europe, and to the European Union, the ECHR, and the WTO).
AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY- CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LImi-
TATIONS 175-210 (2012) (discussing the diffusion of proportionality from
Germany to Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and to
national legal systems in Asia and Latin America, as well as to international
regimes).
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lic purposes. Most rights found in modern constitutions (post-
World War II) and the international bill of rights are qualified;
that is, very few rights are expressed in "absolute" terms. At the
international level, the proportionality framework has been
adapted for use by the courts of the European Union (EU),
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the
World Trade Organization (WTO), in particular, to adjudicate
treaty provisions that permit states to claim derogations from
their treaty obligations in the pursuit of important policy inter-
ests. While judges have adapted PA in different ways in differ-
ent systems, it has been recognized as the single most success-
ful legal transplant of the past sixty years.12
PA is a multi-stage analytical procedure for resolving legal
conflicts of a particular structure, most commonly disputes be-
tween (a) an individual or state holder of a right, or other le-
gal entitlement, and (b) a state, which has taken measures in
pursuit of an important governmental interest, but which
nonetheless burden the right holder. PA is typically triggered
once a claimant has made a prima facie rights claim; it then
proceeds through a sequence of tests. A state measure that
fails any one of these tests is outweighed by the right: The mea-
sure violates the proportionality principle, and the state loses.
It is important to emphasize in advance that PA does not dic-
tate correct legal answers to legal questions, since it does not
tell judges how to weigh the various interests and values at play
in any case. Instead, PA is a procedure that gives a stable struc-
ture to legal argumentation: how lawyers are to make claims
and counterclaims and how judges are to justify their rulings.
The first stage of PA mandates inquiry into the "suitabil-
ity" of the measure under review. The government must
demonstrate that the relationship between the means chosen
and the ends pursued is rational and appropriate, given a legiti-
mate purpose recognized by the constitution or treaty.13 Gov-
ernments rarely lose at this stage. The second step-"neces-
sity"-embodies what Americans know as a "narrow tailoring"
12. Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and
Domain of Constitutional justice, 2 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 574, 595 (2004).
13. This mode of scrutiny is broadly akin to what Americans call "rational
basis" review, although under PA, the appraisal of government motives and
choice of means is more searching. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All
Things in Proportion?: American Rights Doctrine and the Problem of Balancing, 60
EMORY L.J. 101, 102-06 (2011).
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requirement. At the core of "necessity analysis" is a least-re-
strictive-means (LRM) test, through which the judge ensures
that the measure under review does not curtail the right at
stake more than is necessary for the government to achieve its
declared purposes. For some courts, testing for necessity has
the most bite. In practice, judges do not invalidate a measure
simply because they can find-or litigants can invoke-one
less restrictive alternative to that which is under review. In-
stead, most courts check to see that the government did not
refuse one or more less restrictive alternatives that were rea-
sonably available. The third step-balancing stricto sensu-is
also known as "proportionality in the narrow sense." In this
phase, the judge weighs, in light of the facts, the benefits of
the act (already found to have been narrowly tailored) against
the costs incurred by infringement of the right, in order to
decide which side shall prevail. Judges who rely most heavily
on this stage (notably, members of the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court and the Israeli Supreme Court) emphasize
that this final stage allows them to "complete" the analysis, in
order to ensure that no factor of significance to either side has
been overlooked.14
We now turn to how PA diffused as a general principle of
global scope and importance.
A. Diffusion and justification
The three major international courts that have adopted
PA-the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the Appellate Body
(AB) of the WTO-did so without explicit justification or cita-
tion to authority. We encounter the same silence when we
look to the development of proportionality at the national
level.
The proportionality principle emerged in Germany, first
as a matter of legal philosophy in the late-eighteenth century;
then as a judge-made, unwritten principle of administrative
law in the late-nineteenth century; and as constitutional law in
the 1950s. The German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC)
initially invoked elements of proportionality on a case-by-case
14. Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 57 U. ToRoro L.J. 383, 393-95 (2007); Stone Sweet & Ma-
thews, supra note 6, at 106-08.
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basis, without citing to a source or giving a rationale for its
application. As Dieter Grimm, a former Justice on that Court
from 1987-99, writes: "The principle was introduced as if it
could be taken for granted."' 5 In the next decade, the GFCC
constitutionalized it. In 1963, the Court indicated that it would
deploy PA in all cases in which rights were restricted;16 in
1965, it announced that the principle "possesses constitutional
status."' 7 To this day, the Court has never explicated the
source of proportionality, although its importance is now
viewed as primordial. Indeed, in 1968, the GFCC declared pro-
portionality to be a "transcendent standard for all state ac-
tion," binding on all public authorities. PA has since devel-
oped as a kind of doctrinal operating system, a stable interface
for managing the Court's interactions with policymakers (leg-
islators and administrators) and the judiciary.
PA became a pan-European constitutional principle due
to its adoption by the European courts. The ECJ developed
proportionality as an unwritten, general principle of EU law,
with no justification given.' 8 It was introduced-in particular
the least-restrictive means test that is at the core of necessity
analysis-to adjudicate what were, in the 1970s and 1980s, the
most important provisions of the Treaty of Rome (1957), those
concerning the free movement of goods. Culminating in the
famous 1979 Cassis de Dijon decision,19 PA was then applied to
the other basic freedoms (free movement of services, labor,
and capital), and adapted to manage the expansive field of
non-discrimination. By the end of the 1980s, in Schraeder, the
Court announced that "the principle of proportionality is one
of the general principles of Community law. By virtue of that
principle, measures ... are lawful provided that [they] are ap-
propriate and necessary for meeting the objectives legitimately
pursued by the legislation in question. Of course, when there
is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least on-
15. Grimm, supra note 14, at 385.
16. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
June 10, 1963, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFGE] 16,
194 (201) (1963).
17. BVerfG Dec. 15, 1965, BVerfGE 19, 342 (348-49).
18. Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 6, at 139-46.
19. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung far
Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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erous measure must be used. . ."20 For their part, the Member
States have expressly ratified these moves in various ways. In
the most recent example, Article 52 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union (which entered into
force in 2009) states: "Subject to the principle of proportional-
ity, limitations [on rights] may be made only if they are neces-
sary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recog-
nized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and free-
doms of others." National judges, too, must use PA when
adjudicating disputes involving the Charter of Rights, or when
they apply EU law in domains in which the ECJ deploys it.
The ECtHR has been an even more potent force for the
spread of PA across Europe.21 Most Convention rights, like
most rights found in national constitutions, are qualified by
limitation clauses. In the standard formula, states may "inter-
fere with" or "restrict" the "exercise" of a Convention right (in-
cluding to privacy, family life, conscience and religion, expres-
sion, assembly, and association), but only when such interfer-
ences are "prescribed by law" and "are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or pub-
lic safety for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others." In the 1980s, the ECtHR made pro-
portionality its standard approach to adjudicating qualified
rights. By that time, the GFCC and the ECJ were routinely us-
ing PA, as ECHR officials well knew. In the decades that fol-
lowed, PA gradually became a master tool for managing the
evolution of the Convention system. Among other things, the
ECtHR uses necessity analysis to determine how much discre-
tion-the size of the "margin of appreciation"-states possess
when they act under limitation clauses. The Court tends to
raise the standard of protection when a sufficient number of
states have withdrawn public interest justifications for restrict-
ing a right; that is, the margin of appreciation shrinks as state
consensus on higher standards emerges. Diffusion of the prin-
ciple across Europe was assured when, in a series of rulings
20. Case 265/87, Schraeder v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, 1989 E.C.R. 2263,
2269.
21. Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 6, at 146-60.
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beginning in 1999,22 the ECtHR insisted that national judges
deploy PA when adjudicating qualified rights. Failure to do so,
the Court has held,2 3 would constitute a breach of the right to
an effective judicial remedy.24
Prior to its consolidation in European law, proportionality
was native only to Germany and Switzerland. It has now been
institutionalized, typically as a constitutional principle, in all
forty-seven of the Contracting Parties to the ECHR.25 Thus,
whereas many international lawyers may think of national or-
ders as the wellspring of general principles, principles can also
flow from treaty regimes to national courts.
In the international trade regime, PA first appeared in the
pre-WTO era, in a 1989 ruling of a General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) panel: U.S.-Section 337 of the TaiffAct of
1937.26 The Panel deployed a LRM test to reject the United
States' claim for an exemption from certain GATT obligations
under Article XX of the GATT, which contains a list of "Gen-
eral Exceptions" to the GATT. Measures that come under one
of the headings listed in Article XX and meet the conditions
that have been developed by panels and the AB are permitted.
Permissible exceptions include measures "necessary" to: pro-
tect public morals, intellectual property, and the life and
health of humans, animals, and plants; secure compliance with
customs rules; to prevent "deceptive practices" in the market-
place; and to conserve "exhaustible natural resources." In the
WTO, litigating Article XX has been the principal means of
testing the limits of state competences to deal with negative
externalities of trade and other policy problems unilaterally.
22. See e.g., Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493
(1999).
23. See Peck v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41 (2003); Hirst v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 74025/01, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (2005).
24. "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority." Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
25. On the incorporation of the ECHR into national legal orders, see
generally Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Plural-
ism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1 J. GLOBAL CONST. 53 (2012).
26. Report by the Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
L/6439-36S/345 (Nov. 7, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1989).
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The leading AB ruling is Korea-Beef (2001),27 which laid down
general guidelines for necessity analysis. The AB stressed that
such analysis must proceed on a case-by-case basis, through a
"process of weighing and balancing a series of factors," includ-
ing "the extent to which the measure contributes to the reali-
zation of the end pursued," and the impact of the measure on
trade. The defendant State is likely to lose if a less trade restric-
tive, or more GATT-consistent, measure exists. That said, the
application of the LRM test is conditioned by a constraint. To
reject an Article XX defense, judges and the claimant State are
expected to identify specific policy alternatives that were "rea-
sonably available" to the defendant State. The AB further sum-
marized and refined its approach to Article XX GATT in Bra-
zil-Tyres (2007).28
Beyond Europe, high courts in common law systems have
also fully embraced proportionality. The Canadian Supreme
Court imported PA in the mid-1980s to adjudicate qualified
rights in the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While we
know that the justices were influenced by German and ECtHR
doctrine, the Supreme Court chose not to cite to any author-
ity.29 It was not until the 1990s, once PA had become a wide-
spread feature of judicial review globally, that judges began to
justify its adoption. In Israel, Justice Aharon Barak wrote a se-
ries of opinions extensively discussing the origins and diffu-
sion of proportionality-as an international and constitutional
principle-before the Supreme Court adopted PA as its stan-
dard.30 The South African Constitutional Court, which was es-
tablished before the new South African Constitution had been
drafted, adopted proportionality in 1995 after surveying its de-
velopment in German, Canadian, and European law, and
noted differences and similarities with the South Africa con-
text. In the same case, the Court insisted that the drafters of
the new South African Constitution give explicit expression to
27. Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chil-
led and Frozen Beef WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, DSR 2001:1, 5
(Dec. 11, 2000).
28. Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, l 141-44, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007). In this ruling, the AB
provides an overview of its approach as it has evolved since Korea-Beef
29. Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 6, at 113-25.
30. Id. at 132-38.
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the principle, which they did in a general "necessity" clause
that applies to limitation clauses in the Charter of Rights.31
B. Agents of Diffusion
Proportionality diffused to international regimes through
the deliberate choices of specific, identifiable judges. Hans
Kutscher and Pierre Pescatore brought PA to the EU in the
1970s. Kutscher had been a justice on the GFCC during its
crucial foundational period (1955-69), before becoming a
member of the ECJ in 1970. When Cassis de Dijon was decided,
Kutscher was the ECJ's President. Pescatore, formerly a profes-
sor of trade law, sat on the ECJ from 1967 to 1985. He then
went on to chair the GATT Panel that decided U.S.-Section 337
of the Taniff Act of 1937 in 1989, which he used to import PA
into GATT jurisprudence. The WTO-AB ruling in Korea-Beef
(2001), which institutionalized PA as the dominant approach
to Article XX of GATT, was written by Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, who was a member of the AB from 1995-2001,
finishing as its chairman. Ehlermann, a German, had previ-
ously served as a senior official in the EU Commission from
1977-95, and was the Director-General of the Legal Service
when Cassis de Dijon was decided. The main agent for the de-
velopment of PA in the ECHR context was Jochen Frowein, a
member of the European Commission on Human Rights from
1973-93, and its Vice President from 1981-93.32
31. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 36. The limitation clause reads:
36. Limitation of rights
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into ac-
count all relevant factors, including-
a) the nature of the right;
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
2. Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provi-
sion of the Constitution, no law may limit any right en-
trenched in the Bill of Rights.
32. As an academic, Frowein was also associated with the Max Planck In-
stitute for Comparative and International Law, Heidelberg, including as its
director.
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The ECJ, the ECtHR, and the WTO AB use PA-in partic-
ular, LRM testing-to adjudicate provisions that allow states to
claim derogations from their obligations under the treaty's
law, for measures that are "necessary" to achieve public policy
purposes.33 Alvarez, it should be noted in advance, has none-
theless denied that necessity analysis is related to any general
principle of law capable of being justifiably recognized by in-
ternational judges.34 Nonetheless, what comes next should
now seem familiar. As discussed in the next section, Giorgio
Sacerdoti, President of the Tribunal in Continental Casualty,
adapted the WATO AB's version of PA to assess Argentina's
claim for derogation under Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT. Sacerdoti had previously served as a member of the WTO-
AB.
II. THE ARGENTINA CASES: ARBITRATING THE
NECESSITY DEFENSE
The cases generated by the Argentina crisis of 1999-2002
have attracted more attention than any in ICSID's history.
Their salience is due to sheer numbers, the high value of the
compensation being claimed, and the spectacular context-an
economic meltdown of cataclysmic proportions-that gener-
ated them. To add to the drama, for disputes brought under
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, Article XI makes available to Argen-
tina a derogation clause for measures deemed "necessary" to
meet the crisis. Argentina has systematically pleaded Article
XI, and will presumably continue to do so, testing the ICSID
regime's capacity to generate consistent outcomes absent a
doctrine of stare decisis and appellate review for errors in law.
Our focus is on how the various Tribunals and Ad Hoc Annul-
ment Committees responded to the necessity defense, in the
ten awards produced to date.
33. For an analysis of the different uses of PA in these systems, see Alec
Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, Trustee Courts and the Judicialization ofInterna-
tional Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on
Human Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, 1 J.L. &
CT. 61, 78 (2013).
34. Alvarez: Boundary Crossings, supra note 10, at 41. See also Alvarez &
Khamsi, supra note 9, at 440 (arguing that the "least restrictive alternative"
rule is not connected to any principle of international law).
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The cases discussed here are based on the same facts,
which can be briefly summarized. After overcoming military
dictatorship (1973-85), Argentina sought both to democratize
and to build a more open, market-based economy. In the early
1990s, it signed BITs, ratified the ICSID Convention, and
privatized state-run companies and utilities, with foreign par-
ticipation. To encourage investors, Argentina pegged its cur-
rency to the U.S. dollar, promised that capital could move
freely in and out of the country, and gave investors rights to
participate in decisions that would affect revenue streams.
These arrangements unraveled during the 1999-2002 period,
when the country experienced an exploding budget deficit, a
balance of payments crisis, and mounting foreign debt. In
2001, Argentina made deep budget cuts and renegotiated its
debt obligations (which did not stave off default). It eventually
permitted a devalued peso to float on the markets, restricted
withdrawals from bank accounts, and forced conversion of dol-
lar deposits into pesos, so-called "Pesification." It would proba-
bly be impossible to unravel the precise causal relationships
that connect these factors: (1) the onset and deepening of the
economic crisis; (2) mounting political instability, and (3) the
increasingly desperate steps the Argentine State adopted to
regain control. Each of these processes fed into the other two,
leading the situation to spiral out of control. These questions
of fact and causation were among the most difficult arbitrators
faced.
What is undeniable is that Argentina's response to the cri-
sis destroyed the regulatory environment on which foreign in-
vestors had relied ex ante. Investors turned to ICSID claiming,
among other things, that Argentina violated the "fair and equi-
table treatment standard" (FET). In the ICSID system, arbitra-
tors have developed the FET as a multi-purpose principle com-
prised of a wealth of sub-principles, including: good faith; ac-
cess to justice and due process; regulatory transparency; non-
arbitrariness and reasonableness; and the legitimate expecta-
tions of both parties.35 The FET standard allows arbitrators to
35. See S.W. Shill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Compar-
ative Public Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATVE Pus-
LIC LAw 151 (S.W. Schill ed., 2010); Cristoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable
Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 357 (2005);
Kenneth Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 43, 47 (2010).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2014] 925
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
consider a wider range of elements than would be plausible
under the tests for expropriation or regulatory takings (indi-
rect expropriation). The standard clause gives little guidance
to interpreters. The U.S.-Argentina BIT states simply: "Invest-
ment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treat-
ment."36 There is little disagreement that Argentina's response
to the crisis, but for Article XI BIT, would constitute a viola-
tion of the FET provision. The crucial disagreement concerns
how to interpret and apply Article XI.
To date, ICSID tribunals have issued six awards on the
merits of such claims: CMS (May 2005); LG&E (October
2006); Enron (May 2007); Sempra (September 2007); Continen-
tal Casualty (September 2008); and El Paso (October 2011). 7
Cumulatively, the tribunals ordered Argentina to pay nearly
$650 million plus interest in damages, on original requests to-
taling around $2 billion. In addition, Ad Hoc Annulment
Committees have rendered final decisions on four of the
awards (the parties in Sempra withdrew from the process),
while the El Paso annulment proceeding is now underway.
Each of these Committees discussed at length the tribunals'
various approaches to Argentina's necessity defense, with dif-
fering effects. Although the process has destroyed certain ap-
proaches to interpreting Article XI, important ambiguities re-
main, including the status of the proportionality method em-
braced by the Continental Casualty Tribunal.
A. The Evisceration of the "Orrego Vicufia Approach"
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT contains a deroga-
tion clause, a "non-precluded measures" provision which
reads, in its entirety:
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by ei-
ther party of measures necessary for the maintenance
of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with
respect to the maintenance or restoration of interna-
36. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. II, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TRETY Doc. No. 103-02
[hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT].
37. CMS Transmission, supra note 7, 11 354-56; LG&E Energy Corp.,
supra note 7, 1 202; Enron Corp., supra note 7, 1 306; Sempra Energy, supra
note 7, 348; Cont'l Cas. Co., supra note 7, 304; El Paso Energy, supra note
7, 1 50.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
926 [Vol. 46:911
A RESPONSE TOJOS8 ALVAREZ
tional peace or security, or the protection of its own
essential security interests.38
To anyone familiar with how proportionality is used by na-
tional and international judges, Article XI would appear to be
an obvious candidate for the application of PA. It provides a
"carve-out" exemption from BIT obligations for state acts "nec-
essary" to achieve certain, specified state purposes. Further, no
language in Article XI, or in any other provision of this BIT,
would preclude the application of a LRM testing.
Under PA, arbitrators would first decide if the crisis was
severe enough to fall under one of the headings that make the
necessity defense available. As a matter of comparative law, the
notion of "public order" is a broad concept, encompassing
core public policy concerns that state officials, including na-
tional judges, are under a duty to protect. Yet even if the par-
ties to the BIT meant "the maintenance of public order" to
apply only to threats to public security, it would arguably apply
to the Argentina crisis. December 2001 saw rioting in the
streets, a run on the banks, hyper-inflation, and political tur-
moil (five presidents were appointed in a ten-day period be-
ginning on December 20, 2001), including threats of a military
coup. By the end of 2002, one-quarter of all urban workers
were unemployed, and a majority of the population lived
under the official poverty line. Arguably, the situation also
posed a threat to Argentina's "essential security interests." If
the arbitrators found that at least one of these headings cov-
ered the crisis, then they would typically probe the means-ends
nexus which is at the heart of proportionality: suitability (was
the measure designed to meet the crisis?); and necessity (a
LRM test-did the measure harm investors more than was nec-
essary to meet the crisis?), which might also include other
forms of balancing. Of course, if Argentina failed any of these
tests, the defense would be rejected.
In the first four awards rendered, on privatized gas con-
cessions, ICSID tribunals did not embrace proportionality.
The CMS, Enron, and Sempra tribunals found that Argentina
had breached its obligations under the BIT, including the FET
standard, while rejecting Argentina's Article XI pleadings.
These tribunals were all chaired by Francisco Orrego Vicufita, a
38. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 36, art. XI.
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Chilean professor of public international law, who took a simi-
lar approach to Article XI in each case.
The "Orrego Vicufia approach" looks to customary inter-
national law for interpretive guidance to the necessity defense,
that is, it denies that Article XI BIT is an autonomous source
of law, as lex specialis. Instead, Article XI is subsumed by the
customary international law defense of necessity. There is wide
agreement that the best available expression of that law is Arti-
cle 25 of the 2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, elaborated by the International
Law Commission (ILC).3 9 Article 25 ILC reads:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not
in conformity with an international obligation of that
State unless the act: (a) is the only way for the State
to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an
essential interest of the State or States towards which
the obligation exists, or of the international commu-
nity as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a
State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if: (a)
the international obligation in question excludes the
possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) the State has
contributed to the situation of necessity.40
Article XI BIT and Article 25 ILC are differently formulated,
in obvious ways. Article 25 is more restrictive: Necessity may be
invoked to excuse an act that violates international law when it
is the "only way" a state can "safeguard an essential interest" in
the context of a "grave and imminent peril." Article XI BIT
expressly permits state measures under headings that cover a
broader range of contexts. Whereas Article 25 ILC imposes an
"only way" test for necessity, Article XI BIT appears tailor-
made for a LRM test, at least to anyone versed in PA.
39. In all of the rulings discussed here, all of the parties and arbitrators
agreed that Article 25 ILC was authoritative. For an overview of the necessity
defense in customary international law, see Robert D. Sloane, On the Use and
Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility, 106 Am. J. INr'L L. 447
(2012).
40. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts art. 25, 53 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
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In light of Article 25 ILC, the tribunals chaired by Profes-
sor Orrego Vicufia rejected Argentina's necessity defense on
three grounds. First, as the Enron and Sempra awards put it, the
economic crisis did not involve an "essential interest of the
State" in that the "the very existence of the State and its inde-
pendence" was not threatened. 41 In CMS, the Tribunal
stressed that "the Argentine crisis was severe but did not result
in total economic and social collapse," although the tribunal
stated that it would take account of the situation in the dam-
ages phase. 42 Second, the CMS Tribunal interpreted the "only
means" requirement under Article 25 as fatal to the necessity
plea, if any other means than those chosen were available to Ar-
gentina. Since the record showed that experts and others dis-
agreed on what mix of measures Argentina could have taken,
the means chosen could not qualify as the "only means."
Third, the CMS Tribunal held that Argentina's efforts to miti-
gate the crisis had actually contributed to it.
Meanwhile, the LG&E Tribunal, which also found
breaches of the FET standard, accepted the necessity defense
under both Article XI BIT and Article 25 ILC, separately. As a
result, the Tribunal excused Argentina of liability, but only for
measures taken during a specific period of "crisis" (December
2001-April 2003). The outcome contrasts with the main tenets
of the Orrego Vicufia approach. In CMS, the Tribunal had
stated that "the plea of state of necessity may preclude the
wrongfulness of an act, but it does not exclude the duty to
compensate the owner of the right which had to be sacri-
ficed,"43 a view echoed later in the Enron and Sempra awards.44
The level of damages assessed by the LG&E Tribunal damages
($57.4 million) was far below the compensation ordered by
Orrego Vicufia tribunals. Finally, the Tribunal invoked pro-
portionality, but only to indicate that Argentina had not vio-
lated the principle;45 the award otherwise shows no indication
that the tribunal engaged in PA.
41. Enron Corp., supra note 7, 1 306; Sempra Energy, supra note 7,
348.
42. CMS Transmission, supra note 7, 11 354-56.
43. Id. 388.
44. Enron Corp., supra note 7, 1 345; Sempra Energy, supra note 7,
394.
45. LG&E Energy Corp., supra note 7, 195 (". . . the State has the right
to adopt measures having a social or general welfare purpose. In such a case,
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The decisions of the Ad Hoc Annulment Committees in
CMS, Sempra, and Enron eviscerated the Orrego Vicufia ap-
proach. 46 Annulment Committees introduce a dose of hierar-
chy to the ICSID system, while not being empowered to annul
awards on grounds of "errors-in-law." Despite this formal con-
straint, arbitrators on the Committees regularly address such
errors that they detect in dicta, and some have annulled awards
for faulty legal reasoning under other available headings: for
"failure to state the reasons," or "manifest excess of powers." 47
Although the CMS Annulment Committee chose not to annul
the Tribunal's award, it devoted much of its decision to a
pointed criticism of the Orrego Vicufia approach. Less mod-
estly, the Annulment Committees in Enron and Sempra an-
nulled the tribunals' awards, on the basis of deficiencies in the
analysis of Article XI BIT.
The CMS Annulment Committee's decision is the most
significant of the three. ICSID authorities took appointment to
the CMS Committee seriously, selecting two members of the
ICJ, including the President of that Court, as well as the Presi-
dent of the ILC. In its decision, the Committee stressed that it
did not have the authority to act as an appellate court; in par-
ticular, it could not quash an award on the basis of "errors in
the measure must be accepted without any imposition of liability, except in
cases where the State's action is obviously disproportionate to the need be-
ing addressed.").
46. CMS Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment (Sept.
25, 2007) [hereinafter CMS Transmission, Annulment Proceeding]; Sempra
Energy Int'l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16, Decision on the
Argentine Republic's Request for Annulment of the Award (June 29, 2010)
[hereinafter Sempra Energy, Annulment Proceeding]; Enron Corp., Ponderosa
Assets, L.P. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/01/3, Decision on the
Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (July 30, 2010) [here-
inafter Enron Corp., Annulment Proceeding]; Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on the Application for Partial Annul-
ment of Continental Casualty Company and the Application for Partial An-
nulment of the Argentine Republic (Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Cont'l Cas.
Co., Annulment Proceeding].
47. See, e.g., Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID
Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for the Annulment of the
Award, 1 4 (Nov. 1, 2006). See also Benjamin M. Aronson, A New Framework for
ICSID Annulment Jurisprudence: Rethinking the 'Three Generations', 6 VIENNA J.
ON INT'L CONST. L. 3 (2012) (discussing important developments in this
area).
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law," no matter how serious. It then painstakingly detailed the
"manifest" errors of interpretation committed by the CMS tri-
bunal, the most important being the conflation of Article XI
BIT and Article 25 ILC. The CMS tribunal should have ana-
lyzed pleadings under the two norms separately, the Commit-
tee stressed, as they are meant to function differently. The cus-
tomary international law of necessity makes available to a state
a defense for a breach of international law, once a breach has
been found. In contrast, a plea under Article XI of the BIT, if
accepted, precludes a finding of breach of the BIT in the first
place. In extraordinary dicta, the Committee went on to state:
[The] errors made by the Tribunal could have had a
decisive impact on the operative part of the
Award. . . . In fact, it did not examine whether the
conditions laid down by Article XI were fulfilled and
whether, as a consequence, the measures taken by Ar-
gentina were capable of constituting, even pima facie,
a breach of the BIT. If the Committee was acting as a
court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the
Award on this ground.48
Although the Committee's decision is not formally bind-
ing on future tribunals and annulment committees, it has ex-
erted strong persuasive authority.
A second Annulment Committee annulled the Sempra
award. Echoing the CMS Committee's views, the Sempra Com-
mittee noted that while "it may be appropriate to look to cus-
tomary law as a guide to the interpretation of terms used in
the BIT," " [i] t does not follow . .. that [Article 25 ILC] estab-
lishes a 'peremptory definition of necessity and the conditions
for its operation.'"4 9 The Committee then went on to hold
that the Tribunal's failure to separately analyze and apply Arti-
cle XI BIT constituted a "total" failure to apply the law, and
thus a "manifest excess of powers" warranting annulment.50
According to the Annulment Committee, the Tribunal should
have determined, first, whether Article XI BIT (the "primary"
law governing the issue) covered the measures under review;
only if Article XI did not apply should the Tribunal have
moved to consider if breaches of the BIT were excused under
48. CMS Transmission, Annulment Proceeding, supra note 46, 135.
49. Sempra Energy, Annulment Proceeding, supra note 46, 197.
50. Id. 11 213-14.
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customary international law (the secondary law governing).
From this perspective, it appeared that the Tribunal had pro-
ceeded as if Article 25 ILC simply "trumped" Article XI BIT. 51
A third Annulment Committee took a different tack, an-
nulling the Enron award, focusing on the Tribunal's deploy-
ment of an "only means" test. Among other problems, the
Committee found that the Tribunal had failed to give reasons
for how it applied the "only way" requirement of Article 25
ILC. The Committee noted that necessity analysis under Arti-
cle 25 could also imply a LRM test, or an assessment of the
effectiveness of the state measure under review in light of its
harm to investors, both congruent with PA.5 2 The Tribunal
had apparently relied solely on the expertise of an economist
to justify its rejection of Argentina's defense, without suffi-
ciently considering the legal niceties of the law of necessity.
The Committee expressly refused to indicate whether it
agreed with the Tribunal's conflation of Article XI BIT and
the customary international law defense. It saw no point in do-
ing so, in part, because it had found that the Tribunal's rejec-
tion of the necessity defense under both Article XI and Article
25 ILC were thoroughly "tainted by annullable error."53
In sum, the annulment committees destroyed the Orrego
Vicufia approach, expressing strong disagreement with core el-
ements. 54
B. Continental Casualty and Proportionality
In the fifth award, Continental Casualty v. Argentina,'5 5 the
Tribunal's President, Sacerdoti, gave PA pride of place. Conti-
nental Casualty, a provider of employment compensation in-
surance in Argentina, maintained a portfolio of low-risk capital
investments in Argentine financial institutions. Much of the
value of this portfolio was lost with pesification and the
rescheduling of payments on certain debt instruments held by
the company. The company asked for $114 million in compen-
sation. Citing to the CMS Annulment Committee's decision,
51. Id. 11 214-19.
52. Enron Corp., Annulment Proceeding, supra note 46, 369-71.
53. Id. T 405.
54. The LG&E Energy annulment application was withdrawn by the par-
ties.
55. Cont'l Cas. Co., supra note 7.
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the Tribunal focused on Argentina's necessity plea under Arti-
cle XI BIT, relegating customary international law to virtual
irrelevance. It then confronted the crucial issue left open by
the CMS Annulment Committee: what methodology should arbi-
trators use when they assess an Article XI defense?
In response, Sacerdoti adopted the approach developed
in the WTO to adjudicate the necessity defense under Article
XX of the GATT. He justified the move in the following way:
Since the text of Art. XI derives from the parallel
model clause of the U.S. Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation treaties and these treaties in turn reflect
the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the Tribu-
nal finds it more appropriate to refer to the GATT
and WTO case law which has extensively dealt with
the concept and requirements of necessity in the con-
text of economic measures derogating to the obliga-
tions contained in GATT, rather than to refer to the
requirement.of necessity under customary interna-
tional law.56
The award also notes that the investor had "referred to the
case law" under Article XX GATT.5 7
The Tribunal found that the economic crisis fell within
the coverage of Article XI, under both the "maintenance of
public order" and "essential security interests" headings. It
then recognized, ECtHR-style, that the state possessed, ex
ante, "a significant margin of appreciation" in the determina-
tion of how to meet the crisis, thus setting the stage for neces-
sity analysis. The Tribunal adopted the approach laid out by
the WTO-AB, quoting Korea-Beef and Brazil-Tyres. The necessity
of a measure would be determined through "a process of
weighing and balancing of factors," including the relative im-
portance of interests furthered by the challenged measures,
the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends
pursued, and the restrictive impact of the measure on interna-
tional exchange. The Tribunal then assessed the state mea-
sures under review with regard to a list of alternatives that, the
claimant had argued, were just as effective and reasonably
available, but which would have done less harm to the inves-
56. Id. 1 192.
57. Id. 1 192 n.292.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2014] 933
INTERNATIONAL LAW AD POLITICS
tor. With one minor exception, the Tribunal rejected these ar-
guments, finding that Article XI BIT indeed covered Argen-
tina's measures.58
The award survived annulment. The Annulment Commit-
tee agreed with the CMS Annulment Committee's views on the
distinction between Article XI BIT and the customary interna-
tional law defense of necessity.5 9 With regard to the Tribunal's
use of PA, the Committee rejected the company's claims to the
effect that the Tribunal had "erred in its analysis" of WTO ju-
risprudence. "The Tribunal was clearly not purporting to ap-
ply that body of law," the Committee held, "but merely took it
into account as relevant to determining the correct interpreta-
tion and application of Article XI of the BIT."60
The most recent award on the merits is El Paso. The Tri-
bunal, citing to Continental Casualty, focused on Article XI BIT,
treating Article 25 ILC as "secondary law" (to be applied "only"
if Article XI is found not to apply).61 Contrary to the LG&E
and Continental Casualty tribunals, the El Paso Tribunal re-
jected Argentina's necessity defense, on a finding that its mea-
sures had "contributed to the crisis to a substantial extent, so
that Article XI cannot come to its rescue."62 In an unusual dis-
sent inserted into the award itself, arbitrator Brigitte Stern
stated that she would have taken the position of Continental
Casualty on the necessity of Argentina's measures.63
C. A Response to Alvarez
The series of awards and decisions just examined eviscer-
ated the Orrego Vicufia approach, while leaving some ques-
tions open. We submit that the following issues have been
58. The Tribunal found a breach of the FET standard on only one rela-
tively minor claim (awarding $2.8 million plus interest); the Tribunal's ac-
ceptance of Argentina's plea of necessity under Article XI of the BIT meant
rejecting the others.
59. Cont'l Cas. Co., Annulment Proceeding, supra note 46, 127-28.
60. Id. 133.
61. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/
15, 553 (Oct. 31, 2011). The Tribunal also agreed that "the protection
offered by the BIT to the Claimant's investment is suspended to the extent
that Article XI is applicable." Id. 649.
62. Id. 665; see also id. 624 (finding that necessity cannot be invoked if
the party has substantially contributed to it).
63. Id. It 666-70.
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largely settled by the arbitral process: First, Article XI BIT is lex
specialis where it applies, the customary international law of
necessity, as expressed by Article 25 ILC, is largely "superflu-
ous."6 Second, Article XI can cover measures that are neces-
sary to respond to an economic crisis of the kind experienced
by Argentina in the 1999-2002 period. Third, it is not appro-
priate to apply an "only means" test to assess the necessity of
Argentine measures under Article XI BIT. Fourth, the success-
ful invocation of the necessity defense renders "inapplicable"
the BIT's "protections."65 The process of arbitrating Article XI
has produced an alternative to the "only means" test, namely,
the LRM test deployed by the Tribunal in Continental Casualty.
It remains to be seen, of course, whether that test, or PA more
generally, will become the doctrinal standard for necessity
analysis in future awards.
Jos6 Alvarez and his collaborator 66 take opposed posi-
tions on each of these four issues. In a first paper, Alvarez and
Khamsi seek to demonstrate that the CMS, Enron, and Sempra
Tribunals got it right in virtually all important respects, and
that the Annulment Committee in CMS got it wrong.6 7 Thus,
they argue that Article XI is not lex specialis, or a primary rule,
but rather "incorporates" implicitly Article 25 ILC, as well as
the "only means" test. Further, they submit that the necessity
defense, even when accepted, does not excuse the state's liabil-
ity to pay compensation.68 In a follow-up paper, devoted to
criticizing Continental Casualty, Alvarez and Brinks again ag-
gressively advocate the basics of the Orrego Vicufita approach,
bolstering it through analysis of the historical origins of Article
XI BIT, if only from the American point of view. They sum up
their view as follows: "Article XI was essentially an attempt to
preserve existing customary defenses and not to derogate from
64. Cont'l Cas. Co., supra note 7, 1 162; see also El Paso Energy, supra note
7, 1 552 (quoting Continental Casualty).
65. Cont'1 Cas. Co., supra note 7, 1 164.
66. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 9, at 387; Alvarez & Brink, supra note 9,
at 321.
67. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 9, at 427-40.
68. Id. at 454 ("[I]t is difficult to even conceive of an economic situation
of such magnitude that would genuinely pose [the] kind of threat to a state
[envisioned under Article 25 ILC] and that would also require preventing
payment of compensation to a foreign investor.").
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them,"6 9 that is, the Annulment Committees all got the law
wrong in important respects.
These are rear-guard efforts to defend defeated proposi-
tions. It is a blunt fact that none of the five Annulment Com-
mittees that have weighed in thus far provide any support for
the view put forth by Alvarez and Khamski and Alvarez and
Brinks. Indeed, the CMS Annulment Committee characterized
the conflation of Article XI and Article 25 ILC as "a manifest
error in law."70 The Sempra Annulment Committee put it this
way: "It is apparent from this comparison that Article 25 does
not offer a guide to interpretation of the terms used in Article
XI. The most that can be said is that certain words or expres-
sions are the same or similar."71 Moreover, faulty necessity
analysis-of exactly the same kind as that endorsed by Alvarez
and Khamski and Alvarez and Brinks-led to annulment of
the Enron and Sempra awards. Even if one were to accept these
scholars' arguments as defensible, the present state of the ju-
risprudence on Article XI BIT renders them, at best, aca-
demic. We would assign more weight to the positions taken by
the President of the ICJ, a second Justice of the ICJ, and the
President of the ILC-the composition of the CMS Annulment
Committee-than to those of Alvarez and his collaborators.
Arbitrators with responsibilities to make the authoritative
choices in law have done so as well.
In further support of these points, it has come to light7 2
that Orrego Vicufia has recently been dismissed from an ISA
tribunal for lacking impartiality with regard to his views on the
necessity defense, namely, that an "essential security" clause of
the kind found in Article XI BIT "should be interpreted so as
to conform to the 'state of necessity' test under customary in-
ternational law."73 The disqualification74 was decided by the
President of the International Court of Justice, Peter Tonka.
69. Alvarez & Brink, supra note 9, at 334.
70. CMS Transmission, Annulment Proceeding, supra note 46, 1 146.
71. Sempra Energy, Annulment Proceeding, supra note 46, 1 199.
72. We learned of this development only after submitting our paper to
this Journal.
73. Luke Eric Peterson, Francisco Orrego Vicuna is Disqualified from Sitting in
India BIT Arbitration Due to Appearance of Having Fixed View as to Meaning of
"Essential Security" Standard, IA REPORTER (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.iare
porter.com/articles/20131010/print. The disqualification decision was ren-
dered on September 30, 2013, in the UNCITRAL arbitration CC/Devas and
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In the words of a commentator with access to the full decision,
Tonka stressed that "Prof. Orrego Vicufia has stuck to this view
through three arbitral awards, but also in an academic article
defending this view in the aftermath of the partial or total an-
nulment of the three arbitral awards in question [referring to
CMS, Enron, and Sempra, discussed above].. .. Indeed, Judge
Tomka laid particular weight upon Prof. Orrego Vicufia's 2011
academic article where he discloses that he has reviewed the
reasoning of the various ICSID annulment committees, but
hewed to the same view as earlier."75 Judge Tonka's comments
apply to Alvarez's defense of these same views in Beware Bound-
ary Crossings as well.
We now turn to the attack on Continental Casualty. Alvarez
and his collaborators argue that Sacerdoti did not give an ade-
quate justification for importing PA into ISA, and Alvarez and
Brinks go so far as to accuse Sacerdoti of indolence: "[T] he
Tribunal simply reached for an off-the-shelf model presumably
because it was familiar-at least to the President of that tribu-
nal."7 6 Sacerdoti, recall, after noting parallels between Article
XI BIT and Article XX GATT, had considered it more appro-
priate to look to established doctrine in international eco-
nomic law, than to force Article XI BIT into customary law.
The Tribunal could have taken another route. By the time
the award in Continental Casualty was rendered, the propor-
tionality principle had been recognized as an unwritten gen-
eral principle of law by many of the world's most powerful na-
tional and international courts. Indeed, PA had become the
unrivalled, best practice procedure for adjudicating deroga-
tion clauses found in constitutions and many treaties. Judges
have, in effect, read into derogation clauses a LRM test, and
other types of balancing, in order to help them assess the ne-
cessity of state measures. As discussed in Part I, the spread of
proportionality initially took place without explicitjustification
others v. India. CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., et al. v. India, UNCITRAL (Sept.
30, 2013).
74. Orrego Vicufia was nominated by the investor-claimant. As of Febru-
ary 2014, two more challenges to Orrego Vicufia are pending (Repsol, S.A.
and Repsol Butano, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/38;
Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/
08/5)). See also Peterson, supra note 73.
75. Peterson, supra note 73.
76. Alvarez and Brinks, supra note 9, at 356.
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on the part ofjudges, including the diffusion of PA to the Eu-
ropean Union, the ECtHR, and the WTO. The Continental Cas-
ualty award is actually a rare exception. Nonetheless, Sacerdoti
could also have reinforced his position by appealing to general
principles. First, general principles are a recognized source of
international law (Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ); second,
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art.
31(3) (c)), judges are to take into account the "relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties" when they interpret treaties, and proportionality may
well be a "relevant rule."
In Beware Boundary Crossings, Alvarez explicitly rejects this
proposed justification, going so far as to deny that proportion-
ality, with its distinctive necessity test, is a general principle of
law at all." Alvarez and Khamsi, for their part, bluntly state
that "the 'least restrictive alternative' rule is not connected to
any principle of international law that is relevant to interpret-
ing the U.S.-Argentina BIT." They are wrong: Proportionality,
which includes a LRM test at the "necessity" stage, is a widely-
recognized general principle of law that judges in the most
powerful international courts use to adjudicate derogation
clauses.78 In addition, the position Alvarez and Khamsi take
rests on a discredited assumption. "To the extent that we are
correct in concluding that Article XI needs to be read in light
of the customary international law defense of necessity and is
not lex specialis," they write, "it is evident that there is no room
for an alternative test of necessity, such as the least restrictive
alternative." Again, the response is obvious: The arbitral pro-
cess has determined that Article XI BIT is, in fact, lex specialis.
Moreover, as the Enron Annulment Committee pointedly em-
phasized, it may even be defensible to read a LRM test into
Article 25 ILC.7 9
In the follow-up to Alvarez and Khamsi, Alvarez and
Brinks seek to demonstrate: (1) that Sacerdoti's summary
treatment of the negotiating history of Article XI BIT is bad
history; and (2) that (a long list of) structural differences be-
tween the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the GATT 1947 ought to
preclude importing PA from the WTO to ISA. On the latter
77. Alvarez, Boundary Crossings, supra note 10, at 41-42.
78. Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 6; BARAK, supra note 11.
79. Enron Corp., Annulment Proceeding, supra note 46, 369-71
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point, Alvarez and Brinks dwell on the fact that Article XX
GATT-but not Article XI BIT-contains an introductory
clause (the "chapeau") which denies an exemption for state
measures that have been "applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion." The point misses the target entirely, as Sacerdoti himself
has noted in a response to Alvarez and Brinks, which he bur-
ied in a footnote.80 In addition, we would emphasize that, in
many contexts, PA has been developed as a stand-alone frame-
work for assessing discriminatory measures and practices; in-
deed, the LRM test is at the core of the EU approach to non-
discrimination, one of the largest bodies ofjurisprudence pro-
duced by any international court. In the arbitral context, PA
would quite naturally accommodate examination of whether a
state measure under review had been applied in an arbitrary
or discriminatory manner to the investor-claimant, including
under Article XI BIT.
Beyond stubborn reliance on the moribund Orrego Vi-
cufia approach, Alvarez and Brinks are largely silent on the
questions that ought to matter most in this debate: Did the PA
approach to necessity used in Continental Casualty lead the Tri-
bunal to generate an indefensible award? If so, what important
interests or values did the Tribunal leave out of the analysis?
Did the arbitrators err in how they weighed the contending
interests? If so, in what sense were these omissions and errors
due to the analytical procedure deployed? Instead, Alvarez
and his collaborators continuously cast PA, in its WTO form,
as a type of deference doctrine. In fact, of nineteen of the
twenty-one instances in which states have pleaded necessity
under Article XX GATT, the AB has rejected the defense.81 In
any event, the Continental Casualty award engages in a far more
80. Sacerdoti's response conforms to the basics of the WTO-AB's case law
on Article XX. See Giorgio Sacerdoti, BIT Protections and Economic Crises: Lim-
its to Their Coverage, the Impact of Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defence
of Necessity, 28 ICSID Review 1, 32 n.120 (2013) ("[T]he answer [to Alvarez
and Brinks] is that the definition of 'necessity' in WTO case law is not af-
fected by the presence of the chapeau. The latter contains the separate re-
quirement that the application of the exception be non-discriminatory and
in good faith and is subject accordingly to a separate subsequent analysis in
WTO case law . . . ."). With respect to WTO law, Sacerdoti also references
other strong rebuttals of the position taken by Alvarez and Brinks, and by
Alvarez in Beware Boundary Crossings, arguments that we take as definitive. Id.
81. Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 33, at 83.
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sophisticated analysis of Article XI than the awards that came
earlier, not least, in basing it on a transparent procedure for
assessing all factors of importance to the parties.
Finally, Alvarez and Brinks conclude with this extraordi-
nary claim, as if it self-evidently applies to the proportionality
principle:
The legitimacy of cross-regime borrowing may turn
on whether arbitrators factor these structural con-
cerns into their articulated reasons to borrow. . . .
Analogies to the use of foreign law by national courts
seem appropriate here. National judges who seek in-
spiration from foreign law expose themselves to
charges of lack of principle or incompetence should
they fail to consider, for example, the structural dif-
ferences between civil and common law trials when
extrapolating applicable rules of evidence from one
system to another.82
Yet it is obvious that the proportionality principle would never
have spread-from Germany to the European Union to the
WTO; and from civil law systems (in Europe) to common law
systems (Canada, Israel, and South Africa) -had judges been
placed under these strictures. PA diffused to become a global
standard because it works, providing important benefits to
both judges and the legal system as a whole.
III. BOUNDARY CROSSINGS AND DUE PROCESS
We now turn to a broader consideration of the evolution
of general principles. We note in advance that, since seminal
works on the topic produced in the 1950s, there has been little
explicit theorizing, and no systematic empirical research, on
the underlying issues raised here. We begin by briefly contrast-
ing approaches to the development of general principles, and
reject that of Alvarez in Beware Boundary Crossings, insofar as
Alvarez purports to describe actual judicial practices. We then
discuss the evolution of norms of due process, the largest
corpus of judge-made general principles.
The classic approach to general principles, outlined in a
seminal paper written by Bin Cheng in 1954, stresses that gen-
eral principles are superior to the other sources of interna-
82. Alvarez and Brinks, supra note 9, at 352.
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tional law listed in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, in that they (1)
"furnish the juridical basis of treaties and customs and govern
their interpretation and application," and (2) "are common"
to at least some effective rule of law systems, both national and
international. 3 Prior to the entry into force of Article 38 of
the ICJ, judges and arbitrators had already begun developing
the general principles of law in innumerable cases, using a mix
of functional and comparative analysis. They did so, just as IC-
SID arbitrators do today,8 4 in order to fill gaps in the law they
are applying, or the state law that they are reviewing. Further,
unlike 'judicial decisions" and the "writings of learned publi-
cists," the general principles are not defined as "subsidiary
sources" of law under Article 38. Instead, they are an autono-
mous source of legal norms whose legitimacy as positive inter-
national law is simply not in question. At the same time, Article
38(1) (c) is itself incomplete, in that it does not indicate how
general principles, left un-enumerated, are to be identified, let
alone applied.
We, too, emphasize the gap-filling functions of general
principles, but we do not invoke the phrase "gap-filling" in or-
der to disguise the extensive lawmaking that judges and arbi-
trators actually generate when they "fill gaps" through general
principles. An incremental but expansive jurisprudence of
general principles has served to construct (and reconstruct)
the normative foundations of a long list of legal systems. We
also recognize that, compared to the international system of
the 1950s, the legal world has been transformed. International
courts and arbitral institutions have proliferated, and the do-
main of justiciable individual claims against states has mas-
83. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS 383 (1954); see also Rudolph Schlesinger, Research on the General
Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 734, 735
(1957) (discussing Cheng's approach to general principles).
84. Arbitrators have recognized, for example, fundamental rules of natu-
ral justice, including nemo judex in cause propria and audi alteram partem, as
well as the principle of res judicata. See CHENG, supra note 83, at 52, 257
(referring to the Greece-Bulgaria Mixed Arbitral tribunal in the Arakas (the
Georgios) Case (1927), which held that "it is necessary that a judicial proce,
dure should be followed, in the course of which both parties are heard"); see
also Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case
No. ARB/81/1, Award (Nov. 20, 1984) [hereinafter Amco]; Helnan Interna-
tional Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/05/19,
Award, 1 30 (June 14, 2010).
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sively expanded. These two factors have increased the de-
mand, on the part of all users of the system, for general princi-
ples. Put differently, international law can no longer be
understood merely as state-to-state contracting. Perhaps most
importantly, states have proved unwilling or unable to pro-
duce treaties that are relatively "complete" contracts that could
potentially constrain judicial lawmaking. Instead, states rou-
tinely leave crucial terms undefined, an example being the
FET standard in BITs, or the necessity clause in Article XI of
the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Judges are thus all but required to de-
velop general principles in order to resolve disputes effec-
tively; yet, in doing so, judges render more "complete" the
treaty law they apply.85 When sovereigns do not subsequently
override this lawmaking, they at least indirectly legitimize it.
In contrast, Alvarez's Beware Boundary Crossings stresses
state sovereignty and inter-state contracting, committing itself
to two tightly linked arguments. The first is the argument from
original intent: State purposes enshrined in a treaty (a BIT)
operate as a strict constraint on dispute resolution (the exer-
cise of arbitral authority) under that treaty. The second is the
argument from design: Boundary crossings are only defensible
in cases where there exists sufficient institutional "fit" between
the source legal system (from which one imports the princi-
ple) and the target legal system (the new host for the princi-
ple). These arguments prepare the way for the next step: the
claim that each BIT establishes its own legal system, a type of
lex specialis that prevails on other sources, including the gen-
eral principles of law.86 Just as BITs can be distinguished from
one another, the specificities of the investment sector separate
it from other branches of international law, such as those of
human rights, environmental protection, even trade. The im-
85. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUR, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 18 (2d ed. 2012) (pointing out that "general princi-
ples in the sense of Article 38(1) have received increasing attention in recent
practice . . . especially in the case of lacunae in the text of treaties . . . .").
86. See Alvarez, Boundary Crossings, supra note 10, at 37 (contending that
the first flaw of public law theories is to neglect that each treaty "reflects the
preferences of those who design it"). See also the dissenting opinion of arbi-
trator El Mahdi, in Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v.
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, 1 147 (Apr. 12,
2002) (in which the majority of the tribunal found that the state had disre-
garded due process rights to be afforded the investor).
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portance of comparative law is thus reduced to an exercise in
cataloguing difference between systems at a descriptive level,
as if to deny that judges in them face similar problems. From
this perspective, arbitral lawmaking, especially through the de-
velopment of general principles, is suspect or worse, in that it
undermines (rather than facilitates and enhances the effective-
ness of) the state-to-state contracting that undergirds justicia-
ble treaty law.
Alvarez's claims are normative and prescriptive-elabo-
rate wishful thinking-rather than accurate descriptions of
whatjudges actually have done, and continue to do, when they
develop general principles. As discussed, proportionality-
with LRM testing at its core-was developed in Germany as an
unwritten, judge-made principle, before moving from Ger-
many to the European Union to the ECHR to the WTO, as a
general principle. The process violated both of Alvarez's argu-
ments: from original intent, and from institutional fit. Each of
these treaty-based regimes is lex specialis (as are BITs or other
treaty-based regimes), but obvious differences did not inocu-
late these systems from the contagion of general principles.
More broadly, inter-judicial dialogues on general principles
are growing in intensity and importance. Adherents of Alva-
rez's approach may lament that fact, but they cannot explain
it.
We now examine how procedural justice is ensured by
courts and arbitral tribunals in the context of administrative
action. As will become clear, judges have not been bound by
originalism or the constraints of micro-institutional, compara-
tive analysis. Instead, they have built the effectiveness and legit-
imacy of their respective legal systems through developing
general principles. Most judges had little choice, since states
and national officials rarely provide much guidance in that
area. We will also briefly examine the evolution of due process
in a non-Western state, not least because Alvarez, in other set
of arguments, claims that scholarship and practice on matters
of general principles are limited to considerations of Western
liberal democracies.8 7 At the heart of due process is the idea
that adjudication cannot be considered legitimate if it does
87. Alvarez, Boundary Crossings, supra note 10, at 11, 40-42.
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not prevent arbitrariness from the standpoint of the parties.*8
Indeed, at this point in time, the rule of law requires that every
participant in a court proceeding possess rights to due process.
These rights, the product of case law, are enshrined as general
principles.
A. Developments in Due Process
The development of due process is neither a history of
bounded legal systems, nor of a strict positivism that would
deny judges the authority to make law. Indeed, if originalism
always held sway, and boundary crossings were prohibited,
many of the taken-for-granted principles of law, including
those that make up due process today, would not have
emerged. In the United States, even those who proclaim their
fidelity to originalist dogma-Justice Scalia, for example-
have acknowledged that the correct interpretation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion involves a boundary crossing, the importation of the "old
English Law" in this case.8 9 Regressing further, the roots of
this old English law were also a transplant. In the famous
Bagg's case, Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the King's
Bench, referred to procedures that were required "by the law
of the land," precisely in order to introduce a new and original
principle, the maxim audiatur et altera pars, in the context of
the dismissal of a civil servant without permitting him to make
his case. Although Coke referred to the Magna Carta, he relied
much more on Seneca's Medea, to anchor the "new" principle
to the rule of reason more generally.90
88. J. Roland Pennock, Introduction, in DUE PROCESS, NoMos XVIII, at
XVI U. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
89. A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court justices: Antonin Scalia and
Stephen Breyer, 3 I-CON 519, 535 (2005) (Justice Scalia affirming "[I]f you
have that philosophy, obviously foreign law is irrelevant with one exception:
old English law-because phrases like 'due process' and the 'right to con-
frontation' were taken from English law, and were understood to mean what
they meant there.").
90. James Bagg's Case (1615) 11 Co. Rep. 93 (King's Bench) [99a]. See 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1765, ch. 20) (referring to the maxim
audiatur et altera pars as an indispensable requisite of justice); DAWN OLIVER,
COMMON VALUES AND THE PUBLIc-PRIVATE DIVIDE 45 (1999) (providing fur-
ther remarks on the case).
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In fact, the history of due process, now entrenched as a
fundamental requirement of justice, is one of judicial lawmak-
ing, transplants, and unfaithfulness to the legal texts revered
by originalists.
1. France
The doctrinal foundations of French administrative law
are almost entirely the product of an ongoing jurisprudence of
general principles. In the early twentieth century, it became
obvious that the Conseil d'Etat, in the absence of a legislative
code, was increasingly grounding its rulings on general princi-
ples. Nonetheless, the high administrative court did not admit
that it was doing so until after the fall of the Vichy regime
(1944).91 At that point, it began to catalogue general princi-
ples formally. The two leading cases, Aramu and Dame Veuve
Trompier-Gravier,92 concerned the right of the defense against
administrative decisions taken by the executive. In both, ex-
isting rules did not impose a duty on the decision-making au-
thority to inform the addressee of the measure that it would
take. Nonetheless, in Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier, the Conseil
d'ltat declared that a measure that seriously and adversely af-
fects the interests of the claimant could not "legally" be taken
without providing her with an opportunity to contest it, which
in turn required notice. The same doctrine was applied in
Aramu. In this case, the Conseil d'1tat went even further, pro-
claiming that an act of the executive branch was illegal if it
violated the "applicable general principles of law, even in the
absence of a [legal] text."93
To explain these and many other subsequent moves, com-
mentators observed that, in contrast to the state of affairs in
91. See R6n6 Cassin, Introduction, ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL
D'ETAT 3 n.3 (1951); Maxime Letourneur, Les Princepes Generaux du Droit
Dans la jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat, 5 ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL
D'ETAT 19, 19 (1951); Roland Drago, The General Principles of Law in the Juris-
prudence of the French Conseil d'Etat, 11 AM. U. L. REV. 126, 126-27 (1962); see
also L. NEVILLE BROWN &JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 216-21
(5th ed. 1998) (discussing later developments).
92. Aramu, CE Ass., Oct. 26, 1945, Rec. Lebon 213; Dame Veuve
Trompier-Gravier, CE Sect., May, 5 1944, Rec. Lebon 133.
93. Aramu, CE Ass., Oct. 26, 1945, Rec. Lebon 213. For further remarks,
see BENOITJEANNEAu, Les principes g6ndraux du droit dans la jurisprudence
administrative 82 (1954).
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the Ancien Rfgime, French law prohibits any denial of justice.
The Civil Code, after all, provides that "the judge who shall
refuse to judge, on the pretext of the silence, the obscurity, or
the adequacy of the law, may be prosecuted as one guilty of
denial ofjustice."94 Although the Civil Code is mainly directed
at civil judges, the high administrative court claimed that the
duty to provide justice applies "especially" to administrative
judges, given that they are called upon to fill gaps continu-
ously, given the absence of a comprehensive code.95 Nonethe-
less, the Conseil d'Etat denied that it was, in fact, making law,
asserting that "when the judge applies general principles, he
interprets the presumed will of the legislator and does not cre-
ate law."9 6 While remnants of this fiction remain in France, no
one would deny today that the general principles of law, many
of which have been constitutionalized by the Constitutional
Council (the French constitutional court), are unwritten,
judge-made norms that trump administrative acts (in adminis-
trative proceedings) and can at times prevail against statutes
(in constitutional proceedings).9
2. India
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution states: "No person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except accord-
ing to procedure established by law."98 By design, the Framers
94. See JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 12
(2005) (comparing French and Swiss legislative provisions).
95. Aramu, CE Ass., Oct. 26, 1945, Rec. Lebon 213 ("qu'il r6sulte de ces
prescriptions, ainsi d'ailleurs que des principes g(ndraux du droit appli-
cables mime en l'absence de texte, qu'une sanction ne peut A ce titre ftre
prononc6e 16galement sans que l'intdress6 ait 6 mis en mesure de pr&-
senter utilement sa defense").
96. Maxime Letourneur & Roland Drago, The Rule of Law as Understood in
France, 7 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 149 (1958).
97. For an overview of the recent evolution in the rights protection func-
tion of the French Council of State, see generally MITCHEL LASSER, JUDICIAL
TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTs REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE
(2009). See also Aubert Lefas, A Comparison of the Concept of Natural justice in
English Administrative Law with the Corresponding General Principles of Law and
Rules of Procedure in French Administrative Law, 4 QUEEN'S L.J. 197, 229 (1978)
(pointing out the "striking similarities" between English and French princi-
ples of procedural justice); Pascale Idoux, La Contradiction en Droit Adminis-
tratif Franpais, in Facult6 de Droit de Universit( de Montpellier, Collection
ThLses, Vol. 2 (2005).
98. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
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had expressly rejected including a provision akin to the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. They chose a more modest obligation: The administra-
tion is under a duty to follow legislative procedures whenever
it impinges on fundamental rights. They did so, in part, for
procedural reasons. The advocates of the due process clause
argued that the best way to protect the principles of natural
justice, as affirmed in English law, was to follow the practice of
earlier colonies that had gained independence from the Brit-
ish Empire. Others objected, on the ground that to do so
would unduly limit the powers of the legislative and executive
branches of government (Justice Felix Frankfurter had warned
as much, in consultations with an Indian expert who had trav-
eled to Washington to meet him).99
In the Gupalan case, the Indian Supreme Court deferred
to the Founders' intent, and to the literal meaning of Article
21, denying the petitioner, who was jailed under rules gov-
erning preventive detention, habeas protections beyond the
"procedure established by law."' 00 The Court subsequently re-
versed course in a 1967 ruling involving the involuntary retire-
ment of a civil servant, on grounds that her date of birth had
been incorrectly reported.10 The public authority making the
decision neither disclosed its findings nor gave her an oppor-
tunity to respond. The seriousness of these procedural defi-
ciencies led the High Court to grant a writ, which the Supreme
Court confirmed on appeal, after distinguishing the case from
the Gupalan precedent. The Court further held that, because
administrative decisions are often similar enough to judicial
proceedings, they must "be made consistently with the rules of
natural justice." 02
The reconstruction of Article 21 was consolidated ten
years later, in Maneka Gandhi.'03 That case involved a govern-
99. Manoj Mate, The Origins ofDue Process in India: The Role ofBorrowing in
Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 216,
220-21 (2010).
100. A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 (India).
101. State Of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., (1967) 2 S.C.R. 625
(India).
102. A.K. Gopalan v. The State Of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88, 279 (India).
103. Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (India). For a
retrospective, see MANGAL CHANDRA JAIN KAGZI, THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 133 (5th ed. 1991).
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ment order to deprive a citizen of his passport, and therefore
his right to travel. Among other things, the government ar-
gued that the right claimed by the individual was trumped by
the superior, collective interest being protected by the public
authority, namely ensuring that public order is respected and,
thus, the security of all is also respected. The Supreme Court
delved deeply into the government's claims, before rejecting
them. The Court insisted that the claimant should have been
granted a better opportunity to make his case, that the govern-
ment had not given a "good enough reason . . . for im-
pounding [his] passport," and that "the public interest
[could] be better served in some other manner."10 4 The con-
ception of procedural fairness adopted by the Court goes well
beyond the "procedure established by law," even pointing to
proportionality. For Judge Bhagwati, evaluating the signifi-
cance of the ruling retrospectively, it is never enough that a
statute authorizes an interference with personal liberty; in-
stead, it "should prescribe a procedure for so doing and such
procedure must be reasonable, fair and just."105
B. The European Union and the WTO
No less than national judges, international judges have lit-
tle choice but to construct norms of procedural justice
through a jurisprudence of general principles. States, after all,
did not contract codes of procedure in the European Union,
the ECtHR, or the WTO, leaving the details to be worked out
by the courts themselves. In the European Union, until the
2009 Charter of Rights entered into force, the entire corpus of
fundamental rights, including norms of due process, were gen-
erated by the ECJ as general principles (the Member States
had not provided for individual rights under the Treaty of
Rome). Similarly, the ECtHR is the master of its own proce-
dures. Since the Convention has little to say about procedural
justice, the Strasbourg Court has generated guarantees on its
own. The state contracted Dispute Settlement Understanding
of the WTO, too, does not lay down a code of procedures. In
104. Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, 625 (India).
105. P.N. Bhagwati, Forward, in A.N. CHATURVEDI, RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
UNDER INDIAN CONSTITUTION 6 (1984). The book also argues that due pro-
cess, far from being an alien value, "was not unknown" in ancient India. Id.
at 331.
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consequence, the WTO-AB has developed procedures and due
process as general principles. All three of these courts have
gone beyond building due process guarantees into the proce-
dures governing their activities, and they have also developed
a host of general principles that apply to the governmental or-
gans whose measures are under review.
The right to be heard in challenges to EU administrative
actions is an excellent example of such lawmaking. As early as
1962, in Alvis v. Council, the ECJ announced that due process
required a hearing prior to termination of public employ-
ment, holding that the requirement inhered in a "generally
accepted principle of administrative law" in the legal systems
of the Member States.106 A better known case, Transocean
Marine Paint Association v. Commission (1974) ,107 expanded on
the reasoning in Alvis. The claimant, a Dutch corporation,
sued the Commission for refusing to renew certain exemp-
tions to the Treaty of Rome's anti-trust rules. The ECJ, eschew-
ing narrower pathways to the same result, went out of its way to
generate an overarching general principle, that of audi alteram
partem. The right to be heard, which the Court noted consti-
tuted a general principle of law common to the legal orders of
the Member States, could henceforth be invoked by private
parties, despite not being mentioned in any EU legal provision
on the books. The ECJ, it is crucial to stress, confers on gen-
eral principles the same rank as treaty law, and thus it is largely
immune from override by the states, except through treaty re-
vision. The right to be heard, along with other general princi-
ples generated by the Court under the rubric of "good and fair
administration," is now codified as Article 41 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU. 08
The most important WTO ruling on due process require-
ments borne by states under international trade law is the AB's
ruling in Shrimp-Turtles H1 (1998).109 In that decision, the AB
106. Case 33/62, Maurice Alvis v. Council of the EEC, 1962 E.C.R. 109.
107. Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission,
1974 E.C.R. 1063; seeJOHN A. USHER, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAw 73-77
(1998) (discussing Transocean).
108. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 13 (stating that the Charter has the "same legal
value" as EU Treaties).
109. Three reports by WTO dispute resolution bodies are involved: I)
Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
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agreed with U.S. claims to the effect that an interest in the
protection of turtles, as an endangered species, justified a rule
that shrimp harvesters employ a device enabling turtles to es-
cape nets. It nonetheless found the process through which the
United States had taken the measure had violated procedural
norms, and was thus arbitrary and unjustifiable under the
GATT. Not only had the United States not consulted with
many countries whose industries would be affected prior to
the rule's entry into force, but it had adopted the rule without
observing basic notice and comment requirements. Further,
the United States had failed to put into place a transparent
and predictable certification procedure, or to ensure that rea-
sons would be given for the rejection of applications for certifi-
cation. The informality of these processes therefore failed to
protect the rights of the shrimp-exporting nations and their
individual exporters to "basic fairness and due process."110
The AB's turn to due process requirements in Shrimp-Tur-
tles His notjustified by any WTO legal instrument. There is no
"audi alteram partem" in WTO law, and no instrument estab-
lishes a general principle of due process, binding on states,
within the WTO. What, then, was the source of this new law? It
may be that due process standards are part and parcel in any
sound test of non-arbitrariness, to which all national measures
potentially impinging on free trade must be subjected. It may
be that the AB decided to draw on an even broader principle,
embodying requirements of procedural fairness that must be
afforded to those whose rights in the economic sphere are en-
dangered, or interfered with, by the government. It may be
that the AB simply conceived such standards as being "inher-
ent" in an adjudicatory system as such. Dogmatic ambiguity,
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998); II) Appellate Body Report,
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); III) Appellate Body Report, United States-Im-
port Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/RW
(Oct.22, 2001). In the text we refer exclusively to the second [hereinafter
Shrimp 1l].
110. Shrimp II, supra note 109, 181. For further analysis, see Giacinto
della Cananea, Beyond the State: The Europeanization and Globalization of Proce-
dural Administrative Law, 9 EUR. PuB. L. 563, 573-76 (2003); Sabino Cassese,
Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109, 109-10 (2005) (demonstrating that a wide array of principles of
due process has emerged in several international regimes).
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for better or worse, is a characteristic of lawmaking when it
comes to general principles.
C. ICSID Arbitration
In the international investment field, nothing precludes
the recognition of norms of due process of law as general prin-
ciples under Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. Arbitrators
are, in fact, developing general principles of law, according to
the basic gap-filling logic found in other systems. The FET
standard, among other provisions common to most BITs, is a
perfect "variable standard,"11 an incomplete norm that en-
trusts arbitrators with a considerable margin of discretion in
considering issues of fact and law. Arbitrators have used their
discretion to identify and apply due process guarantees that
states owe investors. While they are not cataloguing general
principles in the explicit manner (as, say, the ECJ does), Em-
manuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi have, among others, ar-
gued that they could and should do so under the ICSID Con-
vention. 112 The first generation of ICSID annulment decisions,
rendered by ad hoc committees in Klochner and Amco, strongly
criticized tribunals for their failure to adequately derive princi-
ples of international law from comparative analysis of domestic
law.113 Perhaps, in consequence, later tribunals have largely re-
frained from doing so explicitly.
The latter point made, it is undeniable that arbitral tribu-
nals are developing standards of due process that would be
recognizable to any comparative administrative lawyer as gen-
eral principles of law. 114 They are doing so in order to ensure
111. See HERBERT L. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 131-32 (2d ed. 1994).
Hart distinguishes between "the open texture of law," which means that
there are standards that must be developed by courts in the light of "compet-
ing interests which vary in weight from case to case," while more determinate
rules do not require from them a "fresh judgment from case to case." Id. at
125.
112. Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of 'and' in Article
42(1), Second Sentence, of the Washington Convention: The Role of International
Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID REv. 375, 411 (2003).
113. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & W. Michael Reisman, How Well Are
Investment Awards Reasoned?, in THE REASONS REQUiREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 1, 14-15 (Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & W. Michael
Reisman eds., 2008) (describing the ad hoc committee's decisions).
114. These points are not controversial. See Thomas Wllde, The Specific Na-
ture of Investment Arbitration, in LES ASPECTS NOUVEAUX DU DROIT DES INVESTIS-
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that 'justice" is rendered to investors. Arbitrators not only reg-
ularly refer to due process, they also give negative weight to
facts in state treatment of investors that mirror the types of
procedural dysfunctions and anomalies that are censurable in
the major legal systems of the world. In some cases, arbitrators
endorse the claimants' argument that the decisions taken by
the State were based upon evidence not in the record, or upon
evidence which the recipient had no opportunity at all to test
by cross-examination (or that was even undisclosed). 1 5 In
other cases, they criticize governments for giving no reason at
all.116
In any event, questions of procedural justice chronically
arise in virtually every ISA case, as it did in one of the earliest:
Amco.1 17 The dispute concerned the construction and opera-
SEMENTS INTERNATIONAUX-NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
100 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas W Walde eds., 2007) (arguing that general
principles comprise both international law and comparative law).
115. SeeJoseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18,
Award (Mar. 28, 2011). In Lemire, the claimant argued that Ukraine had vio-
lated the fair and equitable standard in the process of awarding broadcasting
frequencies. The Tribunal upheld the claim that the process was unfair, be-
ing non-public and non-transparent. It added that the Ukrainian executive
had acted without complying "with ... procedures established in the law."
Id. 99. See also Kardassapoulos & Fuchs v. Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB
05/18 & 07/15, Award, 395 (Mar. 3, 2010) (failure to provide notice and a
hearing prior to expropriation of an oil and gas distribution enterprise).
The Tribunal argued that legal procedures put in place by national rules or
practices "must be of a nature to grant an affected investor a reasonable chance
within a reasonable time to claim its legitimate rights and have its claims heard" if
they are to conform to due process of law. Id. (quoting ADC v. Hungary,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award 1 435 (Oct, 2, 2006)). The emergence
of such elements had already been noted by the OECD. ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON THE FAIR AND EQuI-
TABLE TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw (2004).
116. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
97/1, Award, 1 91 (Aug. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Metalclad]. More than a dec-
ade later, in Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica (Unglaube), ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/1, Award, 246 (May 16, 2012), the Tribunal criticized
actions or decisions that are "manifestly inconsistent, non-transparent [or]
unreasonable (i.e., unrelated to some rational policy" (internal citation
omitted).
117. Amco, supra note 84. For further analysis, see Michael W. Reisman,
The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 4 DUKE L. J. 739,
770-75 (1984) (criticizing the ad hoc annulment committees in Klochnerand
Amco for acting as if it were an appellate body with authority to correct errors
in law).
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tion of a hotel in Indonesia, which had been halted when a
national firm ran out of funds to complete it. Amco provided
new investment for the project, in an agreement with a na-
tional development agency that would also permit it to man-
age the hotel. Once the hotel construction was substantially
completed, a dispute arose between the parties. The agency,
claiming that the investor had not fulfilled certain financial
commitments, seized the hotel and replaced its management,
aided by police and military forces. In its award, the Amco tri-
bunal strongly criticized Indonesia, among other things, for
granting to the company only a one-hour hearing, which it
characterized as a violation of a fundamental principle of due
process.118
Thirty years later, arbitrators are clearly pre-disposed to
inquire, often intrusively, into the procedural law in place in
states whose treatment of investors is under review. Since
Amco, tribunals have elaborated and enforced three distinct
standards: the intrinsic value of an orderly procedure; the
maxim audi alteram partem; and, last but not least, the giving
reasons requirement.1 19
One of the most cited and controversial arbitral awards,
Metalclad,120 concerns all three. While the Tribunal also ad-
dressed related issues, the Tribunal put problems of procedu-
ral propriety quite neatly, under the FET standard heading.
After attracting a U.S. waste disposal company to invest in
Mexico, a local authority refused to permit the firm to operate
a hazardous waste facility, in order to protect the environment
and health. As the Tribunal noted, " [t] he permit was denied at
a meeting of the Municipal Town Council of which Metalclad
received no notice, to which it received no invitation, and at
118. Amco, supra note 84, 202. Interestingly, even those who criticise the
award, such as M. Sornarajah, Controls of the Host State, in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAw ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 97, 165 (2d ed., 2004, recognize that providing
due process is a "rule of prudence" and that state interference with foreign
investors is now admissible only "provided due process standards are met."
Id.
119. This section draws on Giacinto della Cananea, The Giving Reasons Re-
quirement: A Global Standard for Administrative Decisions, in GLOBAL STANDARDS
FOR PUBLIc AUTHORITIES 19, 19-23 (Giacinto della Cananea & Aldo Sandulli
eds., 2012).
120. Metalclad, supra note 116. The Tribunal's holding on the need of an
"orderly process" has been referred to and shared by later awards, including
CMS Transmission, supra note 7, at 1 278.
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which it was given no opportunity to appear."121 Pushing fur-
ther, arbitrators also found that the municipality did not tailor
any of its objections to the specifics of the company's proposed
project, thus breaching the "giving reasons" requirement.
Cases like Metalclad raise a point made by Martin Shapiro in
his seminal study on the giving reasons requirement. To the
extent to that the reviewing body (in our case, the arbitral tri-
bunal) simply requests that reasons be given by the deci-
sionmaker, the giving reasons requirement is a procedural
constraint on power. When the reviewing body asks notjust for
reasons, but for good reasons, the requirement is converted
into a substantive one. 122 The development of general princi-
ples, such as the giving reasons requirement, reinforces ISA's
claim to be a mode of transnational governance, not just a
mechanism for dispute resolution.
CONCLUSION
The development of general principles of due process in
public law, at both the national and international levels, is in-
compatible with the views of Alvarez and his collaborators.
Judges have seen no use for either the argument from original
intent, or the argument from design and institutional fit. They
have instead conceived of due process as a fundamental re-
quirement of fairness applying to any situation in which public
authorities have balanced interests in ways that impinge on le-
gal rights and entitlements. Because this situation is generic in
public law-that is, every judge of public law decision-making
will inevitably confront it-Alvarez's boundary constraints are
largely irrelevant. Judges develop general principles because
they need them. Filling lacunae in the applicable law helps
judges do their jobs better, and developing due process helps
to enhance their legitimacy when confronting controversial
cases. It seems clear that judges, at least, do not doubt that
they would be far worse off if they were to follow Alvarez's
counsel.
121. Metalclad, supra note 116, 1 91.
122. Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
179, 186.
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